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Government Policies and the Development of Banking in Kenya1
Martin Brownbridge
1. Introduction
The growth of the Kenyan economy since independence has been accompanied by an 
expansion and diversification of the financial system. In terms o f the numbers and range of 
financial institutions (FIs) and the depth of financial intermediation, financial development has 
proceeded further in Kenya than in most other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). By the 
early 1990s the financial sector included commercial banks, non bank financial institutions 
(NBFIs), development finance institutions (DFIs), insurance companies and a stock exchange. 
The commercial banks and NBFIs, which are the focus o f this paper, include government 
owned, foreign owned and locally owned private sector FIs. Government intervention in the 
financial system has been extensive, although the degree and nature o f influence and control it 
has exerted has varied considerably both between and within the different sectors.
This paper examines the development since independence o f the banking system (the 
commercial banks and the NBFIs) and in particular how it was shaped by government policies. 
The aim is to explore a number of related themes: whether financial repression retarded the 
development of the banking system, did the government attempt to influence credit allocation 
and did this undermine the quality of FIs' asset portfolios?, how effective was prudential 
regulation? have financial sector reforms achieved their objectives o f promoting a more 
competitive, efficient and prudentially sound banking system? The organisation of the 
paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an outline o f  the main elements o f government policy 
and intervention in the financial system. Sections 3, 4 and 5 review the experience and 
performance of the government owned commercial banks, the foreign owned commercial 
banks, and the local private sector commercial banks and NBFIs respectively. The emergence 
of the locally owned private sector financial institutions (FIs) has been characterised by several 
episodes of bank failure since the mid 1980s, the causes o f which are discussed in section 6. 
Section 7 examines the links between financial fragility and the system o f prudential regulation 
and supervision: this section also assesses the impact o f the reforms to the regulatory system 
undertaken since the mid 1980s. Section 8 outlines the main elements o f the financial 
liberalisation introduced since the early 1980s and discusses their impact on the banking 
system. Section 9 concludes.2
The rest of this introduction provides a very brief overview o f the financial system in 
Kenya and its development since independence. The financial system at independence in 1963 
consisted of nine foreign owned commercial banks, o f which the largest were Barclays, 
Standard Chartered and National and Grindlays, together with several NBFIs and DFIs. In the 
decade following independence the government established the Central Bank o f Kenya (CBK), 
three parastatal commercial banks and a number of DFIs.
During the 1970s the NBFI sector began to expand rapidly, stimulated by differences in
 ^ The author is indebted to Charles Harvey, IDS, for invaluable comments, but accepts sole responsibility 
for all errors.
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the regulatory treatment of banks and NBFIs which created market opportunities for the latter. 
Some of the NBFIs were established as affiliates o f the existing commercial banks, others by 
local business people and politicians. The NBFIs (also known as finance houses) have 
engaged in various forms of financial activity including hire purchase, lease hiring, mortgage 
financing and merchant banking. They have not been allowed to offer checking accounts, and 
therefore mobilise most of their funds from interest bearing deposits.
The growth of the locally owned FIs accelerated during the 1980s and began to include 
commercial banks, some o f which were set up by the owners of existing NBFIs. During the 
mid 1980s the financial system suffered its first major episode o f financial fragility with several 
locally owned FIs closed down after encountering severe liquidity problems as result of 
mismanagement and fraud. This crisis led to a series o f revisions to the banking laws, the 
strengthening of bank supervision, the creation of the Deposit Protection Fund (DPF) and the 
formation in 1989 o f a government owned bank, the Consolidated Bank, which was given the 
task o f restructuring a number of failed private sector FIs.
During the 1980s and early 1990s the government introduced a number o f policy 
reforms aimed at gradually liberalising financial markets. These reforms, together with those 
aimed at strengthening the institutional framework o f the financial system, were supported by a 
Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC) from the World Bank.
Financial markets in Kenya were afflicted by severe turbulence in the early 1990s. 
Rapid inflationary increases in the money supply accompanied widespread fragility and fraud 
in the banking sector. A major source of monetary growth in this period was irregular 
borrowing by politically connected FIs (widely known as political banks) from the CBK. 
Under pressure from the IMF, the World Bank and donors, the CBK put around 16 FIs into 
liquidation in 1993/94, while others, including one of the government owned commercial 
banks, were recapitalised by their shareholders.
As o f June 1994, the banking system consisted o f 33 commercial banks and 50 NBFIs; 
approximately 25 of the NBFIs were affiliated to, or shared common ownership with,
commercial banks. O f the 33 commercial banks, 12 were foreign owned, five were in the
public sector and the rest were owned by the local private sector. The deposits o f the
commercial banks amounted to the equivalent of 30% o f GDP in 1993 while those o f the
NBFIs amounted to 14% of GDP. Commercial banking has been dominated by four large 
banks, two foreign and two government owned, which together accounted for 70% of 
commercial bank deposits, but market concentration has been much lower in the NBFI sector.
2. Government Intervention in the Financial System
Government intervention in the financial system in Kenya since independence has had two 
major objectives: First, to control monetary aggregates for macroeconomic stabilisation and 
second, to direct the development of the financial system, and in particular the nature o f its 
asset allocations, in accord with political and economic priorities. A third objective, that o f the 
prudential regulation and supervision, did not initially receive much attention, but has been the 
focus o f increasing emphasis since the mid 1980s.3
Prior to the financial sector reforms of the late 1980s, monetary control was
3
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implemented through liquid asset ratios and (less frequently) cash reserve ratios imposed on the 
commercial banks and NBFIs, and through credit ceilings imposed on the commercial banks 
based on the historic market share of each institution. The CBK also stipulated minimum 
deposit and maximum lending rates of interest for both commercial banks and NBFIs (Killick 
and Mwega, 1990). Real interest rates for both deposits and loans were negative during the 
1970s, but after nominal rates were raised in 1982, real loan and time deposit rates remained 
higher than inflation, or nearly so, through most o f the remainder o f the decade. The monetary 
policy reforms introduced during the 1990s (discussed in section 8) have entailed liberalising 
interest rates and replacing direct controls on lending with open market operations.
Until the mid 1980s, statutory interest rates were set at higher levels for the NBFIs than 
for the commercial banks which gave the former an advantage both in attracting deposits and 
in extending credit on profitable terms. This, together with other differences in the regulations 
governing the two types o f FIs, gave an incentive for the rapid expansion o f the NBFIs in the 
1970s and 1980s.4 Since the mid 1980s, the CBK has gradually reduced many o f the 
differences in the regulatory treatment of the banks and NBFIs, and is currently encouraging 
the latter to either convert into banks or, where applicable, to merge with the banks with which 
they are affiliated.
Government efforts to direct the development of the financial system and the nature o f 
its lending and investment activities mainly took the form of establishing parastatal FIs to 
operate alongside the private sector FIs. The government set up two commercial banks, several 
NBFIs and nine DFIs during the 1960s and 1970s. With the exception o f the nationalisation of 
Grindlays, the established commercial banks were neither nationalised nor interfered with in 
pursuit of government objectives, as in many other African countries: Within the constraints o f 
controlled interest rates and credit ceilings (which applied equally to all banks), the established 
private commercial banks were left to make lending decisions on commercial criteria.
The financial system which existed at independence was dominated by foreign owned 
commercial banks concentrating on trade related finance and a handful o f other FIs which 
mainly served the white settler community. As a consequence a financing gap was perceived to 
exist, consisting of the credit requirements o f African entrepreneurs and of the long term 
financing needs o f the business sector. One of the primary objectives for establishing the 
parastatal FIs was to fill these perceived financing gaps: The emergence of Kenyan owned 
private sector FIs was not regarded as a realistic alternative in the 1960s (Kariuki, 1993, p67). 
The DFIs were set up to provide finance to particular segments o f the market (farmers, small 
scale businesses, etc) but the financial performance of most has been very poor largely because 
many o f their clients have not been profitable (Maynard, 1992).
The commercial banks and NBFIs, in both public and private sectors, were largely free 
o f formal government controls over the sectoral allocation o f their lending, with the exception 
o f a stipulation that they extend credit to agriculture amounting to at least 17% o f their deposit 
liabilities. There were no penalties imposed on FIs which failed to meet this criteria and
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compliance was low (Kariuki, 1993, p291).5 The parastatal banks were however subject to 
informal political pressures to extend credit to particular clients in both the private and public 
sectors (Grosh, 1987, pp 17-19). In addition informal influence over public and private sector 
FIs was exerted by government and politicians through the placement o f parastatal deposits in 
particular FIs.
Although government intervention in the financial system has been wide ranging, 
Kenya has managed to avoid some of the most damaging features o f "financial repression" that 
characterised several other countries in SSA, and this is reflected in the expansion of the 
financial system in terms of both the volume of its liabilities and assets and diversity of 
institutions over the three decades following independence. Whereas in 1966 broad money 
amounted to the 22.9% of GDP, broad money plus the deposits o f other banking institutions 
(virtually all o f which were established after 1966) amounted to 45.4% of GDP in 1990 (see 
table l).6 Despite nominal interest rate controls, real interest rates were not sufficiently 
unattractive (largely because inflation rates were generally moderate) to prevent the Kenyan 
public from increasing its holdings of real financial assets and thus providing the resources for 
the growth o f intermediation.
Public sector deficits have been large, but access to foreign capital together with the 
size o f the domestic financial system has ensured that private borrowers have not been entirely 
crowded out o f domestic credit markets. Credit to the private sector from the banking system 
averaged 76% of net domestic credit during the 1970s and 59% during the 1980s.7 Finally 
because direct government controls over the operations o f the FIs were relatively light, most o f 
the major private sector FIs have not had the quality of their loan portfolios or their profitability 
jeopardised through being forced to extend loans to uncreditworthy borrowers or hold 
unremunerative assets. However, with the exception of the KCB, government influence has 
contributed to the poor financial performance o f many of the parastatal FIs, and in particular 
the DFIs.
3. Government Owned Commercial Banks
The government established parastatal commercial banks in Kenya after independence because 
of the perception that the existing foreign owned banks were failing to serve the credit needs o f 
African businesses. The Co-operative Bank was incorporated in 1965 and the National Bank of 
Kenya (NBK) in 1968. This was followed in 1970 by the nationalisation o f the commercial 
banking operations of National and Grindlays's Bank, which was renamed the Kenya 
Commercial Bank (KCB). Both the KCB and NBK have issued equity on the NSE to the
^ Interviews with officials o f several banks in 1995 confirmed that most had not been meeting the agricultural 
lending requirement.
^ Data from IFS: Broad money (money plus quasi money) consists o f  the currency and deposit liabilities o f the 
banking system (the CBK and the commercial banks). The "other banking institutions" are the NBFIs.
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public in recent years.8 In 1990 two more government owned commercial banks were 
established. The Consolidated Bank was formed to take over and restructure the operations of 
nine private sector FIs which had failed during the 1980s and the Post Office Savings Bank, 
which had previously been confined to deposit mobilisation, set up a commercial banking 
affiliate, Post Bank Credit. Post Bank Credit was closed down in 1993 after a large overdraft 
made to a politically connected borrower was not serviced; it appears to have been used as a 
conduit to channel funds from the NSSF into campaigning for the 1992 elections.
In terms o f deposits, the KCB is (with Barclays) one o f the two largest banks in Kenya, 
holding 22% of total commercial bank deposits at the end o f 1993. It also has 55% o f the 
branches o f all the commercial banks. The NBK is the fourth largest bank with 9.7% of 
commercial bank deposits. Both banks extend predominantly short to medium term credit for 
working capital but have NBFI affiliates which provide longer term loans.
The NBK was established with the main objective of facilitating the financing of 
African businesses and the transfer o f productive assets (such as farmland) to Africans. The 
KCB has had more explicitly commercial objectives, although developmental criteria have 
influenced some o f its lending policies and the expansion o f its branch network into rural areas. 
It was managed under a management contract by Grindlays until the mid 1980s, and has 
generally been allowed a greater degree o f independence from government control than the 
NBK.
The KCB and NBK have mobilised a substantial share o f their deposits from the public 
sector and have also extended a significant share of their loan portfolio to the public sector. 
Public sector deposits have accounted for between 30% and 50% of their combined deposit 
base since they were established (Kariuki, 1992, pp298-9) and around 50% o f the NBK's loan 
portfolio has consisted o f lending to the public sector and co-operatives. The NBK has placed 
greater emphasis on lending to agriculture and agro-based industries than other banks; these 
sectors accounted for 38% of its loan portfolio in 1987.9
At the request o f the government, both the KCB and NBK have extended credit to 
parastatals or co-operatives for strategic reasons, in circumstances where lending would not 
have been justified on a purely commercial basis. The government has also ordered parastatal 
deposits to be transferred to these banks, and then on lent to particular borrowers. Government 
guarantees have often been provided when credit has been extended on government 
instructions to public sector borrowers which do not meet commercial criteria. Nevertheless a 
number o f bad debts have been incurred from lending made at the direction o f government, a 
problem which has been especially serious for the NBK.
During the mid 1980s the KCB embarked on a major expansion programme with the 
aim of extending banking services into rural areas which had not previously been served by 
banks. This initially adversely affected the KCB's profits, as many of the rural branches 
incurred losses, but in recent years the rural network has become more profitable, in part 
because rural deposits have been channelled into high yielding investments, such as TBs, in the 
urban areas.
The KCB recorded very strong profits over the last two decades and appears to have 
been well managed, having inherited both bank management and a solid commercial banking
^ The KCB issued equity amounting to 30% o f its capital in 1988 and 1990 and the NBK sold 20% o f its 
shares to the public in 1994.
^ NBK Annual Report and Accounts, 1987.
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culture from Grindlays. It avoided incurring significant bad debts, in part because most o f its 
lending was properly secured. Like the two major foreign owned banks, the KCB's profitability 
was boosted by the low cost of its funds, with almost half of its deposits consisting o f demand 
deposits.
The NBK was much less profitable. Its finances were undermined by non performing 
loans, particularly to parastatals, and the agriculture and real estate sectors. In 1979 it recorded 
a large loss after having to make provisions for 11 % of its loan portfolio and required an 
injection of equity from the government to maintain capital adequacy. In 1984, its NBFI 
subsidiary, KJENYAC, incurred a substantial loss after failing to recover a large loan secured 
against real estate made in the late 1970s. Furthermore the Auditor-General's report to the 
NBK's 1985/86 accounts noted that the NBK and KENYAC had deposits amounting to KSh 
105 million - a sum equivalent to 40% of the NBK's capital and reserves - in companies 
(presumably FIs) which were in liquidation or had closed down (see section 6 for details o f the 
banking crisis of the mid 1980s).
The underlying cause of the NBK's financial fragility, which was its lack o f 
independence from political influence over lending decisions, was not addressed during the 
1980s. As a consequence its problems intensified in the early 1990s. The NBK was forced to 
make provisions for doubtful debts amounting to 15% of its loan portfolio in 1992 and to write 
off almost 10% of its loan portfolio during the 1992 and 1993 financial years.10 It suffered a run 
on its deposits in 1993 after adverse reports in the media and the closure o f another public 
sector bank, Post Bank Credit. As a result a restructuring plan was adopted under which the 
government injected Ksh 0.5 billion in equity and provided Ksh 1.5 billion in loan guarantee 
repayments; a combined sum which amounted to 16% of the NBK's total assets. In addition the 
NSSF converted deposits held with the bank into NBK shares. The NBK's top management 
was replaced, improvements were made to loan appraisal procedures, a loan recovery 
programme was initiated and internal controls were strengthened. The NBK has also made 
efforts to enhance customer services with the introduction o f credit cards and facilities to sell 
TBs to the public.
To summarise this section, the experience of the two main government owned banks 
over the last 20 years differed significantly. Although both banks were expected to pursue 
developmental objectives, especially lending to the public sector, the KCB was able to conduct 
most o f its operations along commercial lines. It generated strong profits and avoided 
accumulating substantial volumes o f bad debts. The KCB remained financially sound because 
it inherited the management and culture of an established private sector bank, and because 
government pressure to extend credit to non creditworthy borrowers was relatively limited. The 
KCB extended its branch network in rural areas in response to government policy but this 
appears to have only temporarily reduced its profits. As such its performance has not been 
dissimilar to that o f the established foreign owned banks. Given that the government and 
politicians exerted considerable influence over the lending and investment decisions o f other 
public sector FIs, the question arises as to why the KCB was able to remain relatively 
independent of government control. It is possible that the NBK and the various DFIs in Kenya 
provided government and politicians with sufficient opportunities to access credit for 
developmental needs and political patronage without also having to resort to the resources o f 
the KCB, hence the latter was left alone to pursue largely commercial objectives.
* ® NBK Annual Report and Accounts 1993.
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Conversely, government and political pressure on the NBK to extend credit to 
borrowers who would not have qualified for loans on commercial criteria alone was much 
greater. The NBK lent heavily to the public sector and politically connected borrowers whose 
loan repayment record was poor, with adverse consequences for its profitability and the quality 
o f its asset portfolio. Although the financial problems of the NBK had already become apparent 
by the late 1970s, efforts to restructure the bank were insufficient to prevent much larger losses 
due to non performing loans from recurring. The underlying cause o f the financial distress in 
the NBK, political pressure to extend loans on non commercial grounds, was not rectified. 
Major restructuring of the NBK's management was delayed until 1993 by which time the 
accumulated losses were substantial. Whether the restructuring exercise will enable the NBK to 
operate along commercial lines and avoid the politically connected lending which had 
previously undermined its balance sheet remains to be seen. Arguably it will only be able to 
attain sufficient independence from political interference if the government sells all o f its equity 
in the bank to the private sector.
4. Foreign Owned Banks
The foreign owned banks in Kenya include subsidiaries o f Barclays, Standard Chartered Bank 
(SCB), ABN Amro, Citibank, and several banks from Asia, the Middle East and other African 
countries. Barclays and SCB are two of the three largest banks in Kenya, together accounting 
for 38% o f total commercial bank deposits in 1993 while the remaining foreign owned banks 
are relatively small, jointly accounting for less than 5% of deposits. Most o f the foreign banks 
have at least one NBFI subsidiary. Both Barclays and SCB are engaged in retail and corporate 
banking and trade financing while most o f the smaller foreign owned banks operating in niche 
markets.
Barclays and SCB have avoided accumulating significant non performing loans by 
adopting conservative lending policies with strict lending controls largely modelled on those of 
their parent banks. Their lending has been concentrated mainly on prime (ie the most 
creditworthy) corporate customers; MNCs and the larger local companies. The existence o f a 
strong private sector in Kenya, which includes a large MNC presence, combined with limited 
competition in loan markets has enabled them to avoid having to lend to less creditworthy 
customers. They have extended very little credit to parastatals, to co-operatives or to 
politicians. Their lending has been predominantly used for financing working capital, is short 
or medium term, and fully secured with realisable collateral. Forms of collateral which might 
prove difficult to realise or trade, such as agricultural land, have been avoided. As noted in 
section 2, the major private sector banks have been free o f government pressure to extend 
finance to sectors to which they were reluctant to lend, with the exception o f the minimum 
requirement for agricultural lending.
Barclays and SCB have both instituted strong internal controls to minimise potentially 
risky lending. The discretion of branch managers to extend loans is limited, with lending 
officers required to obtain extensive information from prospective borrowers, and both banks 
have procedures to protect officers from political or other pressures to influence lending 
decisions. Lending is concentrated in a handful o f the larger (mainly urban) branches which 
have good credit officers. Credit risk management is an important element o f both staff training 
and internal organisation. Asset allocations are governed by internal regulations which ensure 
appropriate portfolio mix and diversification.
Both banks experienced growth in real assets since independence (although they have
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lost market share particularly to the government owned banks). Barclays undertook a major 
branch expansion programme in the rural areas in the mid 1980s with the aim o f mobilising 
rural deposits. The rural branch network of Barclays (along with that o f the KCB) appears to 
have been profitable because it has enabled the bank to mobilise low cost rural deposits and 
channel these into remunerative loans and investments, primarily in the urban areas. SCB 
however announced the closure of around a third of its branch network in 1995 as part o f a 
shift in the emphasis o f its operations in Kenya away from retail banking (major aspects of 
which are regarded as unprofitable) to concentrate on trade and corporate finance.
Both banks made profits in most years in Kenya since independence and Barclays in 
particular generated very large profits over the last six years. The profitability o f Barclays and 
SCB has been a result o f a combination of factors. Their cost of funds has been low because 
their reputation and branch networks allowed them to mobilise a high proportion o f total 
deposits from current accounts and to pay relatively low interest rates on savings accounts. 
Moreover profitability was not undermined by non performing loans. Barclays and SCB have 
had several important advantages of over other banks in Kenya which allowed them to 
mobilise deposits cheaply and to lend predominantly to prime corporate customers. These 
include their reputation for deposit security and their countrywide branch network (rivalled 
only by the KCB), while their international network provided them with important advantages 
in securing business from the MNCs.
The controls on interest rates and bank charges imposed by the CBK until 1991 may 
have had some adverse effects on bank profitability but, given the substantial share o f demand 
deposits in their total deposits, average lending margins were sufficiently wide to ensure that 
low risk lending was remunerative for the banks. In the last few years since interest rates and 
other controls were liberalised, the largest banks appear to have been operating an unofficial 
cartel in order to maintain interest rate spreads and to levy high, and in some cases, exorbitant 
bank charges.
5. Local Banks and NBFIs
Since the late 1970s locally owned (henceforth local) private sector banks and NBFIs have 
proliferated in Kenya. By June 1994 there were around 17 locally owned private sector 
commercial banks and 35 NBFIs in operation; these FIs accounted for almost 25% of 
commercial bank deposits and approximately 50% of NBFI deposits. Although the distinctions 
are not absolute, the local FIs can be divided into three categories according to ownership; 
political banks (which have included prominent politicians among their shareholders), 
independent (of politicians) Asian owned FIs and independent African owned FIs. In recent 
years the most rapid growth has occurred among the Asian owned FIs, including some with 
political connections. The local financial sector has experienced several episodes o f financial 
fragility with a number of these FIs having failed since the mid 1980s, an issue which is 
explored in the following section. In this section we examine the motivations for the growth o f 
the local FIs and some of the pertinent characteristics o f the sector.
The growth of the local FIs has been motivated by a number of factors.
First, there has been a widespread perception that the large banks, including the 
government owned banks, were failing to provide adequate credit facilities to local businesses, 
especially small scale enterprises. Many local businesses could not fulfil the creditworthiness 
criteria demanded by the large banks while in addition the processing of credit applications 
often entailed considerable delays (sometimes o f several months) before loans were disbursed.
8
Hence a market opportunity was perceived to exist for local FIs to supply loans to businesses 
excluded by the established banks.
Second, various aspects o f the system o f financial sector controls and regulations in 
operation during the 1970s and 1980s segmented the financial markets and created 
opportunities for the NBFIs to undertake certain types o f business, such as hire purchase and 
lease hire, for which they were either protected from competition from commercial banks or 
were provided with a competitive advantage (such as the freedom to charge higher interest 
rates). Although the regulatory segmentation of financial markets prompted the foreign and 
government owned commercial banks to set up their own NBFI subsidiaries, it appears that 
sufficient opportunities remained for local finance houses to attract customers.11
Third, a class of local businessmen, both African and Asian, emerged which had 
accumulated capital from various forms of commercial activity including, in the case of some 
o f the Asian entrepreneurs, money lending. The Asians in particular had the capital, some of 
the expertise required (which could also be obtained by hiring staff trained by the established 
banks) and a potential market among business people in their own communities, to make 
investment in finance houses and banks a viable proposition. The market among businesses 
from their own communities provided the owners o f some o f the local FIs with lending 
opportunities for which they may have had a comparative advantage over the established banks 
arising from their more intimate knowledge of borrowers and their ability to bring community 
pressure to bear on loan defaulters.
Fourth, many o f the local banks and NBFIs were established by politicians or by 
businessmen with close links to politicians. These political connections were used to obtain 
public sector deposits, thus overcoming one of the major impediments to the viability o f newly 
established FIs, the difficulty and cost of mobilising funds.
Fifth, there has been a perception that banking offers higher rates of return than many 
other business opportunities in Kenya. This perception has probably been correct over the last 
few years when banks have made large profits from investing in TBs while profitability in the 
real sector has suffered due to recession.
Finally, the regulatory barriers to entry, especially for NBFIs, were not onerous. 
Minimum capital requirements were low; between 1968 and 1980 the minimum capital 
required to start a locally incorporated NBFI was equivalent to less than $100,000. Although 
the minimum capital requirement for a NBFI was raised a number of times during the 1980s it 
remained under $500,000 and by the early 1990s exchange rate devaluation had reduced it to 
the equivalent o f less than $250,000. Until 1992 the statutory minimum capital required to 
open a locally incorporated bank amounted to less than $1 million (see table 4 below). FIs also 
faced only very limited entry barriers related to the suitability or expertise of their owners and 
managers.
Until the late 1980s the local FIs were concentrated mainly in the NBFI sector. With the 
erosion o f the regulatory differences between banks and NBFIs, most o f the new entrants in 
recent years have been banks, in many cases started by people who had already established 
NBFIs. Several o f the local NBFIs converted to commercial banks in 1994/95 in order to be 
able to accept current accounts and to conduct foreign exchange transactions.
Because o f the perception that they are less secure than the larger foreign and
 ^  ^ It was also much easier, in terms of capital requirements, liquidity and personnel, to operate a NBFI than a 
commercial bank.
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government owned banks, the local FIs face much higher deposit costs. They have to pay 
higher interest rates than the larger banks to attract savings and term deposits and the deposit 
base o f the local banks includes a lower proportion o f current accounts than those o f the larger 
banks.12 The chairman of one o f the local banks estimated that his average cost o f deposits was 
around ten percentage points higher than those of Barclays and SCB. Competition for deposits 
among the local FIs is strong, and several have run advertising campaigns in the local media to 
attract deposits. Local FIs have been susceptible to bank mns whenever bank failures have 
occurred over the last decade and as a consequence have to maintain high levels o f excess 
liquidity.
The local FIs mainly lend to small and medium scale businesses. Some o f the Asian 
owned FIs tend to concentrated their lending on Asian businesses, and in some cases on 
businesses owned by members of the same Asian communities as the owners o f the FI. The 
local NBFIs have mainly been engaged in financing asset purchases, in particular through hire 
purchase, lease hiring and mortgages. With the exception o f the mortgage finance companies, 
most of these NBFIs have provided short or medium term loans. The local banks have 
concentrated mainly on the provision o f overdrafts and short term loans together with letters of 
credit. Many o f the Asian owned banks derive a large share o f their business from trade 
financing; their access to this market being facilitated by the prominent role in the 
import/export trade of Asian owned businesses.
Because their costs of funds are higher than those o f the larger banks, the local FIs have 
to charge higher lending rates, with the consequence that their loan portfolios are affected by 
adverse selection problems. The most creditworthy borrowers in Kenya have generally 
obtained loans from the established foreign or government owned banks or their NBFI 
subsidiaries, which are able to extend credit to prime borrowers at the lowest lending rates. The 
local FIs are able to attract borrowers despite their higher lending rates for two reasons. First, 
they are prepared to offer credit to customers who have been refused credit (or would have 
been refused had they applied) by the established banks because they cannot satisfy the strict 
creditworthiness criteria demanded by the latter. Second, they provide prospective borrowers 
with a more personal and flexible service than that provided by the established banks and as a 
such are able to give much quicker decisions on loan applications.
One implication o f the tendency of the local FIs to lend to those customers rejected by 
the established banks is that their borrowers are less creditworthy and more likely to default. It 
is likely that some of the Asian owned FIs are able to use community links to reduce default 
probabilities, but some o f the African owned FIs are clearly in a more vulnerable position from 
the adverse selection of their borrowers. Aside from those FIs which have collapsed or been 
taken over by the CBK due to mismanagement or fraud, several o f the currently operational 
local FIs have encountered difficulties with non performing loans over the last ten years. Bad 
debts have arisen for a number of reasons including poor lending procedures, the depreciation 
o f assets used as collateral (such as vehicles bought under hire purchase agreements) and the 
difficulties o f realising security in the courts. Some o f the local FIs had to be recapitalised by 
their owners in the late 1980s or early 1990s, partly to offset losses arising from non 
performing loans and partly to meet the higher capital requirements demanded by the CBK.
The experience o f those local FIs which have managed to avoid financial distress 
suggests that survival for this sector depends upon how closely they can adhere to several basic
The NBFIs are not allowed under the Banking Laws to accept current account deposits.
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rules. These include maintaining a diversified loan portfolio and deposit base, only lending 
against realisable security, only extending long term loans at variable interest rates, avoiding 
taking deposits from, or lending to, politicians or the public sector, remaining highly liquid, and 
employing professional management free from undue interference by shareholders in 
operational decisions.
The growth o f the local FI sector since the mid 1970s has brought both benefits and 
costs for financial markets in Kenya and the wider economy. Some o f these FIs have clearly 
been used for major fraud and/or been mismanaged at the expense o f taxpayers and depositors 
and the credibility o f other, better managed, local FIs. Many local FIs however represent 
genuine (ie non fraudulent) attempts to provide financial services, despite a variety of 
difficulties related to the adverse selection of their borrowers, the high costs o f their deposits 
due to their lack o f a sound reputation with depositors, and in some cases, shortages of skilled 
and experienced personnel. The local FIs that have survived have introduced an element of 
much needed competition into urban deposit markets and have provided loans, hire purchase, 
trade financing, etc to borrowers who would have been denied credit from the established 
private and public sector banks. They have also provided much more flexible and quicker 
services for their customers, especially with regard to decisions on loan applications, than the 
established banks.
6. Bank Failures
Since the mid 1980s the local financial sector has experienced a series o f bank failures 
involving mainly, but not exclusively, the so called political banks. Around one third o f the 
local banks and NBFIs in Kenya have either been closed down or been placed under statutory 
management by the CBK, usually after running into acute liquidity problems and/or because of 
repeated violations of banking regulations (see table 5). Many o f the failed FIs were technically 
insolvent when closed down. The extent of the fragility within the financial system has exposed 
deficiencies in the regulatory and supervisory framework in Kenya, an issue which is examined 
in the following section. This section analyses the nature and causes o f the bank failures in 
Kenya.
The first cycle o f bank failures occurred during 1984-86 with the collapse o f the Rural 
Urban Credit Finance and the Continental and Union Bank groups. These FIs were liquidated 
after they were unable to repay deposits obtained from financial parastatals. In 1989/90 several 
small NBFIs and building societies collapsed and were taken over by the CBK; six o f these FIs, 
together with the Union Bank group, were then merged to form the government owned 
Consolidated Bank group, which was given the task of restructuring their operations and 
recovering their bad debts.
During the 1990s the scale o f bank failure escalated.13 Six banks and 11 NBFIs were 
put into liquidation or placed under the statutory management o f the CBK for serious 
infractions o f the banking regulations during 1993/94 following pressure from the IFIs and
13 Whereas the FIs which failed during 1984-86 accounted for only around 2% at most o f  the total deposits o f 
the commercial banks and NBFIs, and those which failed in 1989 for only about 1%, the failures o f 1993/94 are 
likely to have involved a much larger share. Although it is difficult to be precise in the absence o f  published 
accounts from many o f the failed FIs, it is likely that those which failed in 1993/94 accounted for at least 10% of 
the total deposits o f  the banks and NBFIs; three of the liquidated FIs alone accounted for 7% o f the gross assets o f 
the commercial banks and the NBFIs in 1992.
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donors. These included several relatively large banks such as Pan African Bank, Trade Bank 
and Post Bank Credit.14 Several more have faced the threat of closure from the CBK for 
infractions of banking regulations but have survived after being recapitalised by their owners.15
Although there are differences, several common features have characterised many of 
the bank failures in Kenya. These include the involvement of leading politicians, including 
government ministers, as shareholders and/or directors o f many of the failed banks.16 Political 
connections were used to secure public sector deposits and in several cases to circumvent the 
requirements of the banking laws. Some o f the failed FIs relied very heavily on deposits from a 
few particular parastatals, while in the early 1990s, several of the political banks also 
accumulated large overdrafts from the CBK.17 Their dependence on political connections to 
obtain funds in turn influenced lending decisions with adverse implications for the quality of 
their loan portfolios. The ownership structure o f many of the failed FIs was highly 
concentrated, with one individual or family effectively controlling the institution including its 
lending policies.
The major causes of the bank failures in Kenya have been the accumulation of bad 
debts (and attendant liquidity crises) because of fraudulent or imprudent lending, including 
lending to companies connected to politicians. Adverse selection problems with regard to 
prospective borrowers, the poor quality o f management and inadequate capitalisation have also 
contributed to the financial fragility afflicting the locally owned FIs.
Insider lending has been a prominent feature o f several cases of bank failure in Kenya. 
Large non performing loans had been extended to the shareholders and directors of failed FIs 
(or companies owned by them) often to finance real estate development. Some of the most 
spectacular examples of insider lending include the Continental Group and the International 
Finance Company; the latter had extended almost 90% of its total loan portfolio to its owner, a 
government minister.18 The Pan African Bank (PAB), which in 1992 was the fifth largest bank 
in Kenya in terms of gross assets, had lent over 50% of its loan portfolio to companies
' ^  Post Bank Credit was not a private sector bank but an affiliate of the government owned Post Office Savings 
Bank.
15 Transnational Bank, owned by leading KANU politicians, accumulated a large portfolio of non performing 
loans, including many extended to companies associated with its shareholders (Weekly Review, November 5, 
1993, pp40-41). This bank was technically insolvent in 1992, according to a World Bank report, as well as in 
breach of the CBK's cash reserve, liquidity and capital adequacy requirements. It was recapitalised in late 1993 
and is still trading.
' ^  With some exceptions, the FIs which collapsed in the 1980s were mainly set up by Kikuyu politicians, while 
many of those which were placed under liquidation in the 1990s were owned by Asians with high level political 
connections.
17 An addendum to the CBK's 1992/93 Annual Report and Accounts reported that the CBK was owed almost 
Ksh 17.8 billion (around 17% of the total liabilities o f  the commercial banks) from the overdrawn accounts of 
three of the commercial banks which it has since placed under liquidation or statutory management. The provision 
of overdrafts by the CBK to the political banks was a major cause of the loss of monetary control and consequent
inflation which occurred during 1992/93. CBK claims on the commercial banks rose from less than Ksh 1 billion
in December 1991 to Ksh 21.3 billion in May 1993. This increase was equivalent to two thirds of the 41% 
expansion of the broad money supply during this period.
'^Finance, 1-15 February, 1991, pp 12-18.
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controlled by its Chairman, an Asian businessman, mainly to finance the construction o f a five 
star hotel. Trade Bank, another bank which had expanded rapidly to become the ninth largest 
bank in Kenya before being placed under liquidation in 1993, had extended a large share of its 
non performing loans to companies associated with its shareholders, one o f  whom was a 
former minister and powerful KANU politician, and had also invested heavily in real estate 
development.19 Both Trade Bank and Pan African Bank had used political connections to 
mobilise public sector deposits.20
Because of adverse selection the loan portfolios o f many o f the locally owned FIs have 
included the least creditworthy borrowers in the credit markets. Some of the failed FIs had 
neither the financial resources nor the commercial expertise to manage the risks involved in 
serving this end of the market (World Bank, 1988, pp38-39). Many o f the bank failures 
involved mismanagement of various forms. Loans were extended without proper security, 
documentation or evaluation of the creditworthiness and viability o f borrowers. Rural Urban 
Credit Finance, the first FI to collapse, had extended thousands o f largely unsecured loans to 
residents of a slum area of Nairobi (which was represented in parliament by Rural Urban's 
founder and Chairman) to purchase matatus (minibuses), plots of land and houses.21 In other 
cases, FIs ran into difficulties because loan portfolios were insufficiently diversified or because 
the same collateral had been used to secure more than one loan. Because many o f the FIs were 
undercapitalised (the paid up capital of the Continental Bank amounted to less than 1 % of its 
deposit base22) their solvency was easily jeopardised by non performing loans.
Liquidity problems, which have been a pervasive feature of the financial fragility 
among the locally owned FIs, arose as a result o f non performing loans, excessive levels of 
investment in fixed assets, and the mismatching of asset/liability maturities. In some cases 
liquidity crisis were triggered by the sudden withdrawal o f parastatal deposits, allegedly for 
political motives.23
Many of the failed FIs expanded too rapidly, obtaining funds from parastatals or by 
offering attractive packages to depositors which undermined lending evaluation procedures (as 
in the case of Rural Urban) and/or squeezed interest rate margins. The quality o f managers was 
often low, either because they lacked experience or because they had been recruited from 
among the less able employees of the larger banks.
Several of the political banks closed down in 1993 were also used to facilitate other 
forms of large scale frauds, some of which were probably linked to the financing of the 1992 
election campaign. Several of these frauds involved the abuse o f pre-shipment export finance
^  The Weekly Review, April 23,1993, pp 13-18.
Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, No 2 1992, p i 2.
^  The Accountant, Oct/Dec 1992, pp 2-5.
^  Weekly Review, 30 July 1993, p22.
23 There is a belief among some members of the banking community in Kenya that some o f  the locally owned 
FIs which failed in the 1980s (especially those owned by Kikuyu politicians) were deliberately undermined for 
political reasons through the withdrawal of their parastatal deposits. Although it is not denied that mismanagement 
did occur, the belief is that these FIs were attempting to conduct genuine banking business rather than commit 
ftaud and that they could have been rescued had the CBK and government taken a more flexible approach (see 
also "Rebuilding Indigenous Banks", The Accountant, Oct/Dec 1992, pp 2-5.
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and export compensation facilities provided to banks by the CBK, the most notorious o f which 
was the Goldenberg scandal; the alleged theft o f a huge sum of money through fraudulent 
claims for export compensation submitted through the Exchange Bank.24
The bank failures in Kenya have imposed substantial costs on the economy, and in 
particular on taxpayers, who have bome the burden of the CBK's losses and of reimbursing 
insured deposits. They have also had adverse effects on those local FIs which have been 
managed in an honest and prudent manner: bank failures damage the credibility o f FIs 
throughout the local FI sector, raising the costs of deposits and forcing FIs to maintain high 
levels o f excess liquidity as a precaution against bank runs.
7. Bank Supervision and Regulation
The bank failures in the 1980s and 1990s exposed the deficiencies in the system o f prudential 
supervision and regulation o f the commercial banks and NBFIs. Both the legal framework and 
the CBK's supervisory capacities had evolved to regulate a banking system confined to 
subsidiaries o f multinational banks. These had well qualified staff and strong internal controls 
and therefore required only the minimum of supervision (World Bank, 1989). The emergence 
o f the local FIs from the mid 1970s onwards radically changed the nature o f the demands 
placed on bank supervisors. Not only was there a proliferation of new FIs, but many were 
inadequately capitalised and were incompetently or fraudulently managed. The prudential 
system proved deficient in three important respects: The banking laws were not strict enough 
(particularly prior to 1985), the CBK did not have adequate supervisory capacities, and some of 
the FIs were able to use political connections to flout the banking laws.
The 1968 Banking Act, which replaced the Banking Ordinance enacted during the 
colonial period, provided the legislative framework for the banking industry. The Act gave the 
Minister for Finance responsibility for licensing banks and NBFIs and the CBK responsibility 
for inspecting these FIs. It also imposed prudential requirements on the banks and NBFIs 
including minimum capital requirements, a liquid asset ratio to be determined by the CBK, and 
restrictions on excessive loan concentration, lending against inappropriate security and (by 
banks but not NBFIs) lending for, or investing in, immovable property or speculative activities.
The collapse of Rural Urban Credit Finance in 1984 led to the strengthening o f the 
banking legislation. The authorities regarded the existing legislation to be inadequate, 
particularly in respect of the licensing procedure, the level of minimum capital requirements 
and restrictions on insider or connected lending (CBK, 1986).
The 1985 Amendments to the Banking Act attempted to rectify these deficiencies. 
Licensing applications were henceforth to be routed through the CBK (although the final 
decision remained with the Minister for Finance). Both minimum capital requirements and 
minimum capital/deposit ratios were raised, while FIs were also required to transfer a specified 
share o f profits into a statutory reserve fund and hold these reserves in approved securities. The 
directors of FIs were prohibited from extending unsecured loans to themselves, their relatives 
or connected companies, and were made liable for losses arising from unsecured lending, while 
the restrictions on investment in real estate, equity and speculative assets were extended to the
24
The Law Society o f  Kenya, in its private prosecution o f those alleged to be involved in the Goldenberg 
scandal, claimed that the fraud amounted to 18 KSh billion - a sum which amounts to almost 6% o f  GDP - 
(Economic Review, Jan 30-Feb 5, 1995, p l l ) .  The Exchange Bank is also under liquidation. The Economic 
Review (various issues) has comprehensively covered the Goldenberg scandal.
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NBFIs. In addition an amendment passed in late 1984 gave the CBK power to remove and 
appoint managers of FIs which were not being run in a satisfactory manner. These and 
subsequent amendments in 1987 and 1988 (which included limits on ownership concentration 
and further increases in minimum capital requirements) were incorporated into a new Banking 
Act enacted in 1989.
The rapid growth in the number o f FIs in the 1980s was not matched by an appropriate 
expansion in the supervisory capacities o f the CBK. The Bank Supervision Department (BSD) 
o f the CBK lacked sufficient numbers of professional staff, and the reporting requirements and 
systems through which the BSD received financial data from the FIs were inadequate. Until 
1993 FIs were not required to submit much of the information necessary for effective off site 
examination, such as the classification of loans according to performance criteria and details of 
loans which might be in breach of banking regulations. Supervision was also impeded by 
political interference. As a consequence the BSD was unable to perform effective offsite 
surveillance and to conduct regular on site inspections; many of the banks and NBFIs were 
able to avoid inspection for substantial periods (Kariuki, 1993, PP306-9).25
The failure to prevent the financial fragility which emerged in the mid 1980s could be 
attributed largely to weaknesses in the banking legislation and in the CBK's supervisory 
capacities. These weaknesses were at least partly addressed with the revisions to the banking 
laws noted above and the strengthening of staffing levels at the BSD.26 Nevertheless this did 
not prevent bank failures on a much larger scale from occurring in the early 1990s. The main 
reason why the regulatory and supervisory system failed a second time was political 
interference in the inspection o f FIs and the enforcement of banking laws.
Political considerations influenced the granting and renewal o f banking and NBFI 
licenses even when applicants had not fulfilled the necessary requirements. The Minister for 
Finance granted FIs exemptions from provisions o f the Banking Act such as those restricting 
loan concentration, insider lending, lending for real estate and ownership concentration.27 The 
ability o f the BSD to examine politically connected FIs was obstructed, as were their efforts to 
enforce compliance with the banking laws when infractions were discovered: In some cases 
inspection reports recommending remedial action were prepared but never sent to the inspected 
FIs.28 Most importantly, the CBK and DPF extended large overdrafts to several o f the political 
banks, allowing them to continue trading despite the fact that they had become illiquid as a 
consequence of fraud and mismanagement.
Since the first half o f 1993 prudential regulation has been tightened as evidenced by the 
measures initiated by the CBK to put 17 FIs into liquidation for violating various provisions of 
the Banking Act. In particular, the capital adequacy and liquidity requirements have been more 
rigorously enforced and strict rules governing FIs' access to CBK overdrafts have been
The BSD was able to undertake on site inspections o f  only 26 FIs during 1990 and 1991 out o f  a total o f 
over 80 FIs in operation at the time (Kariuki, 1993, pp307-8).
^  The bank failures o f  the mid 1980s also led to the establishment o f the Deposit Protection Fund (DPF) in 
1986 to enhance public confidence in the safety o f  their deposits and therefore reduce the risk o f bank runs. The 
DPF also provided a mechanism for liquidating failed FIs (CBK, 1986).
97  . .
Section 53 o f  the Banking Act gave the Minister for Finance authority to grant exemptions from provisions 
o f  the Act.
World Bank reports and interviews with CBK staff.28
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introduced. Minimum capital requirements have also been raised. The BSD is receiving more 
detailed and relevant information from FIs and its staffing levels have been further 
strengthened. Moreover, with the replacement o f the CBK Governor and Minister for Finance 
and liquidation o f most o f the political banks, the extent o f political interference in banking 
regulation has been reduced. Whether these improvements, which came about largely as a 
result o f pressure from the donors and IFIs, can be maintained depends on the political 
economy o f Kenya.
S. Financial Liberalisation
A variety o f reforms to the financial system have been introduced since the early 1980s. 
Alongside measures intended to strengthen the institutional structure and regulatory framework 
o f the financial system, such as the revision of banking laws and improvements in supervision 
discussed above, a number o f reforms have been introduced to liberalise financial markets and 
the conduct o f monetary policy. The pace o f reform accelerated towards the end o f the 1980s 
financed by the World Bank's Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC). This section 
outlines the financial liberalisation reforms adopted in Kenya and assesses their impact on 
banking markets.
The main policy components o f financial liberalisation included the increase in 
controlled interest rates from 1982. This ensured that pre-tax interest rates were positive in real 
terms, or were close to positive levels, for most o f the period since then. The gap between TB 
and lending rates was narrowed in 1982. Interest rate differentials between commercial banks 
and NBFIs were reduced in the mid 1980s and the spreads between minimum deposit and 
maximum lending rates were widened in the second half o f the 1980s. Interest rates were 
deregulated in 1991; the controls over lending related fees and charges having been removed in 
the previous year.
The credit ceilings imposed on the commercial banks and NBFIs were abolished in 
1993 (they had not always been strictly enforced) with the CBK placing greater emphasis on a 
combination o f open market operations, minimum cash reserve and liquid asset ratios and 
changes in the discount rate to control monetary aggregates.29
The banking system has also been affected by measures introduced during the 1990s to 
liberalise foreign exchange markets. In 1992 the commercial banks were authorised to deal in 
foreign exchange and to accept foreign currency deposits from exporters in forex retention 
accounts. A market determined flexible exchange rate was adopted in 1993.
Liberalisation is intended to bring about a number o f beneficial effects in financial 
markets. These include first, the stimulus to financial savings and deposit mobilisation through 
the incentive effects o f higher real deposit rates. Second, higher lending rates should encourage 
a more efficient allocation o f loanable funds by reducing opportunities for borrowing at low or 
negative real interest rates. Third, liberalisation should eliminate distortions which arise from a 
variety o f other administrative controls, such as those which segmented financial markets 
between banks and NBFIs, and promote greater competition in financial markets.
There is little evidence to suggest that the increased real interest rates prevailing since 
1982 had a positive impact on savings and deposit mobilisation. Interest bearing deposits held
29
During the 1980s the CBK had promoted the development o f  regular TB and bond auctions and provided 
rediscounting facilities for short term securities in order to facilitate the introduction o f  OMOs.
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in the commercial banks and NBFIs rose as a percentage o f GDP from 24.2% in 1981 to 31.7% 
in 1993 but the rate of increase was less than in the 1970s when real deposit rates were lower.30 
Mwega, Ngola and Mwangi (1990) tested the impact o f changes in real deposit rates on private 
sector savings and on financial savings defined as currency and deposits held in the banks and 
NBFIs. Their results did not support the proposition that real deposit rates had a significant 
positive effect on either private savings or financial savings.
The impact of liberalisation on the efficiency o f credit allocation in financial markets in 
Kenya is more difficult to determine empirically, not least because many o f the intended 
consequences are microeconomic in nature and may not be evident in macroeconomic 
statistics. Raising real lending rates will not necessarily improve resource allocation in credit 
markets if  distortions remain elsewhere in the economy. In its assessment o f the FSAC, the 
World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department argued that the efficacy o f  liberalisation and 
other financial sector reforms in improving credit allocation was limited because the demand 
for credit from high yielding investment projects was depressed by constraints in the real sector 
such as poor infrastructure and price controls (World Bank, 1993).
There is some evidence to indicate that liberalisation has stimulated more competition 
in banking markets. With the removal of interest rate controls, the market for urban deposits 
appears to have become more competitive. Many of the local banks and NBFIs have been 
competing aggressively for deposits over the last few years by offering more attractive deposit 
rates, as well as other services, and through extensive advertising in the media. In addition 
efforts have been made by many FIs to attract retail customers by improving customer services 
and by marketing new products such as credit cards.
There is probably less competition in credit markets, where the local banks are at a 
disadvantage in servicing the loan requirements o f large scale prime borrowers because of 
capital constraints, and where some of the local banks orientate primarily on a particular 
section o f the community. Nevertheless some of the local banks, particularly the Asian owned 
banks, have begun to challenge the dominance of the established banks in the provision of 
trade finance.
Despite the evidence of greater competition in some segments of the banking market, 
the banking system remains effectively oligopolistic, with the large banks operating an 
informal cartel in setting interest rates and charges. Barclays, SCB and KCB have been 
insulated from more vigorous competition by their size, their reputations for deposit safety, 
their extensive local branch networks and their international links. The large profits generated 
in the last few years are testimony to the very limited nature o f competition faced by the large 
banks.
The efforts to enhance the efficiency of intermediation through financial liberalisation 
were undermined by the deterioration of public finances in the early 1990s. A large increase in 
government bank borrowing to fund a fiscal deficit equivalent to around 8% o f GDP in 
1992/93 contributed to rapid money supply growth and inflation rates o f 30% in 1992 and 46% 
in 1993. In order to absorb liquidity through OMOs, TB rates were raised to as high as 70% in 
mid 1993. Although interest rates had been deregulated in 1991, the commercial banks were 
clearly reluctant to raise their lending rates to match those of TBs or the rise in inflation 
because this would have threatened the solvency o f some of their borrowers. Commercial bank
30 Data are from the EFS and refer to savings, time and foreign currency deposits o f  deposit money banks and 
time and savings deposits of other banking institutions.
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maximum lending rates were on average around nine percentage points below the rate of 
inflation in 1992 and 16 percentage points lower than inflation in 1993.31 Most banks and 
NBFIs virtually stopped extending new loans and invested their surplus funds in TBs instead, 
generating large profits as a result.
9. Conclusions
The financial sector policies adopted by the government in Kenya had very varied effects on 
the development of the banking system. Government intervention took the form of establishing 
publicly owned commercial banks, imposing direct controls over interest rates and some 
components of the asset portfolios o f FIs and bringing informal pressures to bear on 
government owned FIs to influence lending decisions. However, the degree of "financial 
repression" was relatively moderate did not prevent both financial deepening and the 
emergence o f a diverse range of FIs. An important development since the late 1970s has been 
the entry into financial markets o f locally owned private sector FIs, although the four large 
banks, two foreign and two government owned, have retained their dominant role in the 
banking system.
Since the early 1980s a variety o f financial sector reforms have been implemented. 
These include the gradual liberalisation o f interest rate and other controls, revisions to the 
banking laws to strengthen prudential regulation, and the creation of a Deposit Protection Fund. 
In addition there have been a number o f different methods adopted to deal with bank distress: 
Several failed local FIs were taken over and merged to form a government owned bank in 
1990, the CBK closed down other failed local FIs, and one of the two large government owned 
banks, the NBK, was restructured in the early 1990s.
The government owned commercial banks were expected to address non commercial 
objectives, in particular lending to African businesses, parastatals and co-operatives and the 
extension o f banking services into rural areas. The NBK has been afflicted by substantial non 
performing loans, extended mainly to the public and/or agricultural sectors, which seriously 
weakened its financial position. It required an injection of capital from the government in the 
late 1970s, but the underlying cause o f its financial difficulties - political interference in its 
lending policies - was not addressed. Consequently the quality of its loan portfolio experienced 
further deterioration and it required a major recapitalisation and restructuring in the early 
1990s. In contrast the KCB managed to avoid accumulating significant bad debts and 
generated strong profits. The bulk o f its operations have been conducted along strictly 
commercial lines with most o f its lending being well secured and, as demonstrated by the big 
foreign banks, well managed commercial banking has generally been a profitable business in 
Kenya.
The two large foreign banks, Barclays and SCB, have both remained conservative in 
their lending policies, concentrating on the provision of short term well secured loans to prime 
corporate customers and avoiding potentially risky sectors such as parastatals. Apart from a 
minimum requirement for agricultural lending which was not enforced, direct government 
controls over their lending were light and they were not obliged to fund the government deficit 
at negative real interest rates.
Barclays and SCB have been profitable throughout the post independence period for
Interest rate data is from QER. No data on the NBFIs1 lending rates are given.
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several reasons. They have been well managed, faced only limited competition, and the lack of 
direct government controls allowed them to concentrate on low risk commercial banking 
operations. The latter has proved to be highly remunerative in Kenya for two reasons: there 
was a large pool of creditworthy customers among private sector businesses, and the cost of 
mobilising funds was low.
One of the most dynamic features o f the Kenyan financial sector has been the vigorous 
growth of local NBFIs, and more recently, commercial banks. The potential for high rates of 
return combined with the perception that the established banks were not adequately serving 
important sections of the credit markets, especially local businesses, have stimulated the 
emergence of this sector. The relationship between government and the development of the 
local FIs has been complex. Their growth was facilitated by the market opportunities created 
by the differential regulatory treatment o f banks and NBFIs, by the low legislative barriers to 
entry and in some cases by the lack of enforcement o f banking regulations. In addition some of 
the local FIs have been able to expand rapidly by utilising political connections to mobilise 
public sector deposits.
Financial fragility has characterised many of the local FIs, mainly because of fraud, 
especially insider lending, imprudent management, undercapitalisation, and the difficulties 
involved in having to service the least creditworthy segments o f the credit market. While 
political connections undoubtedly facilitated the establishment and growth o f many of the local 
FIs, they also contributed to their downfall, not least because loans made to politically 
influential borrowers were often not serviced.
It appears that most of the local banks and NBFIs which have remained independent of 
political connections have avoided serious financial distress. This suggests that a viable niche 
exists in financial markets for local FIs if they are professionally managed and operate on 
sound commercial principles. These FIs have made a positive contribution to financial 
development by promoting greater competition and by extending credit to borrowers excluded 
from access to loans from the major commercial banks. The difficulties they face include 
operating on narrow interest rate spreads because of their high cost of funds and the need to 
maintain substantial levels of excess liquidity to guard against deposit runs.
Bank regulation and supervision has not been very effective in Kenya. Following the 
bank failures of the mid 1980s, the banking laws were revised and the supervisory capacities of 
the CBK strengthened, but these improvements were undermined by political interference 
which prevented the CBK from inspecting political banks or enforcing compliance with the 
banking laws. The consequences of this became apparent with the banking crisis of 1993, 
when it emerged that several of the political banks with severe liquidity and solvency problems 
had been able to access large overdrafts from the CBK. Since then the CBK has more 
rigorously enforced the banking laws, liquidated many of the political banks and appears to 
have gained a greater degree of independence from political pressures.
Since the early 1980s most of the direct controls, other than those relating to prudential 
regulation, have been phased out in a process of financial liberalisation. The impact of 
liberalisation on financial markets is difficult to determine with precision. There is evidence of 
more vigorous competition among FIs for deposits and in providing customer services. 
However it is not clear that liberalisation stimulated deposit mobilisation by the banking system 
in aggregate nor that it has necessarily improved the efficiency o f credit allocation in the 
presence of widespread distortions elsewhere in the economy.
To summarise, the banking system in Kenya is in much stronger shape than in most 
other countries in SSA. There were deficiencies in post independence financial sector policies:
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political interference in some of the government owned banks and DFIs undermined their 
solvency, prudential regulation and supervision was inadequate, and controls over interest rates 
impeded efficiency. But serious disintermediation was avoided and the bulk o f the banking 
system remained solvent. Financial sector reforms were introduced on a rather piece-meal basis 
beginning in the early 1980s. The reforms included a strengthening o f  the legislative 
framework for prudential regulation, and the removal of interest rate and other controls which 
has stimulated greater competition in banking markets. The reform effort was impeded by 
political constraints, principally continued political interference in the government owned 
banks and the enforcement o f banking laws, and by the impact o f large fiscal deficits on 
interest rates and inflation. Nevertheless there is a core o f sound and profitable banks providing 
a relatively diverse range of services, and since 1993 the authorities have adopted a much 
stricter approach to bank regulation.
Table 1
Dates of Establishment of Government Owned, Foreign Owned and 
Local Private Sector Banks and NBFIs
Commercial Banks
Year Foreign Owned Government
Owned
Local Private Sector Total
before 1971 8 2 1 13
1971-75 2 0 1 3
1976-80 4 0 0 4
1981-85 1 0 4 5
1986-91 0 1 5 6
NBFIs
Year Foreign Owned Government
Owned
Local Private Sector Total
before 1971 4 0 2 6
1971-75 1 3 1 5
1976-80 3 0 8 11
1981-85 2 0 17 19
1986-91 4 0 12 16
Source: reproduced from Kariuki (1993, p307).
Key M onetary and Banking Statistics: 1966-1992
KSh Billions 1990 Prices
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Table 4
Minimum Capital Requirements for Locally Incorporated 
Commercial Banks and NBFIs: KSh millions and $ millions
Year Commercial banks 
KSh m $ m
NBFIs 
KSh m $ m
1956-68 2 0.28-0.28
1968-80 2 0.28-0.27 0.5 0.07-0.07
1980-82 5 0.67-0.46 1.0 0.13-0.09
1982-85 10 0.92-0.61 5.0 0.46-0.30
1985-92 15 0.91-0.41 7.5 0.46-0.21
1992- 75 2.07-1.37* 37.5 1.04-0.69*
* value as o f June 1995
Notes: The minimum capital requirements were denominated in Kenyan shillings. These were 
constant during each o f the periods shown in the table. However the equivalent values in 
dollars depend upon the exchange rate, which was not constant. Hence two dollar values are 
shown for each period, one determined by the exchange rate prevailing in the first year o f each 
period and the other determined by the exchange rate in the last year. The capital requirements 
introduced in 1992 were still in force in 1995.
Minimum capital requirements for NBFIs were first established in 1968.
Sources: Central Bank of Kenya, 1986, CBK Annual Report, 1992/93.
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Table 5
Failures of Banks and NBFIs and other FIs in Kenya
1984-86 Rural Urban Credit Finance
Continental Bank, Continental Finance 
Union Bank, Jimba Credit 
Pioneer Building Society
1993-94 International Finance Company
United Bank
Trade Bank, Trade Finance, Diners Finance
Pan African Bank, Pan African Finance
Post Bank Credit
Exchange Bank
Thabiti Finance
Export Bank
1995 Meridien BIAO Kenya
Includes banks and NBFIs closed down or placed under statutory management by the CBK.
Post Bank Credit was a public sector bank and Meridien BIAO was foreign owned; all the 
others were owned by local private sector.
Where more than one FI is shown on the same line, as with Continental Bank and Continental 
Finance, they share common ownership.
Sources: CBK and miscellaneous.
Abbreviations
A F C  Agricultural Finance Corporation
C B K  Central Bank of Kenya
C IC  Capital issues Committee
D FC K  Development Finance Corporation of Kenya
D F I Development Finance Institution
D P F  Deposit Protection Fund
F I  Financial Institution
FS A C  Financial Sector Adjustment Credit
H FC K  Housing Finance Corporation o f Kenya
IC D C  Industrial and Development Finance Corporation
K C B  Kenya Commercial Bank
K IE  Kenya Industrial Estates
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KSh Kenya Shillings
MNC Multinational Corporation
NBFI Non Bank Financial Institution
NBK National Bank of Kenya
NSE Nairobi Stock Exchange
0 M 0  Open Market Operation
QER Quarterly Economic Review
SECAL .... Sectoral Adjustment Loan 
SEFCO .... Small Enterprise Finance Company
SOE State Owned Enterprise
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
T B  Treasury Bill
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